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Notes and Comments
Gay Parenting: Myths and Realities*
Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow'
I. Introduction
Of all parents who seek child custody, perhaps the least visi-
ble and least studied is the gay father.2 As fathers in general,3
* The author would like to thank Grace and Christopher O'Toole for fostering in
the author a deep respect for individual difference. The author is also deeply
appreciative of the patience and support of David John Varoli.
1. T.S. ELIoT, The Hollow Men, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS, 1909-1950 58
(1952).
2. Skeen & Robinson, Family Background of Gay Fathers: A Descriptive Study, 54
PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 999 (1984). The unique situation of the gay father has been largely
ignored in research done on fathering. Id. at 999. For New York cases considering paren-
tal homosexuality, see Anonymous v. Anonymous, 120 A.D.2d 983, 503 N.Y.S.2d 466 (4th
Dep't 1986) (bisexual mother); Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 108 A.D.2d 120, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180
(1st Dep't 1985) (gay father); Guinan v. Guinan, 102 A.D.2d 963, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830 (3d
Dep't 1984) (alleged lesbian mother); DiStefano v. DiStefano, 60 A.D.2d 976, 401
N.Y.S.2d 636 (4th Dep't 1978) (lesbian mother); M.A.B. v. R.B., 134 Misc. 2d 317, 510
N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1986) (gay father); and In re Jane B., 85 Misc. 2d
515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1976) (lesbian mother).
For discussions of child custody decisions involving homosexual parents, see Basile,
Lesbian Mothers I, 2 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 3 (1974); Bozett, Gay Fathers: Evolution of
the Gay Father's Identity, 51 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 552-561 (July 1981); Note, In the
"Best Interests of the Child" and the Lesbian Mother: A Proposal for Legislative
Change in New York, 48 ALB. L. REv. 1021 (1984) (authored by Margaret Clemens);
Hitchens, Social Attitudes, Legal Standards and Personal Trauma in Child Custody
Cases, 5 J. OF HOMOSEXUALiTY 89 (1979-1980); Jacobs, Divorce and Child Custody Reso-
lution: Conflicting Legal and Psychological Paradigms, 143 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 192 (Feb.
1986); Kleber, The Impact of Parental Homosexuality in Child Custody Cases: A Re-
view of the Literature, 14 BULL. Am. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 81 (1986); Polikoff, Lesbian
Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Obstacles, Legal Challenges, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
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and gay fathers4 in particular, however, become more assertive
and vocal in seeking custody,5 the legal community will necessa-
rily become extensively involved in the resolution of those emo-
tionally charged child custody disputes in which one parent is an
acknowledged gay father.
This Comment discusses the rights of a gay father seeking
child custody in a New York court and potential challenges to
his assertion of those rights. Part II of this Comment offers a
comprehensive analysis of the historical evolution of social, legis-
lative, and judicial proscriptions against homosexual expression,
with the objective of examining the social stigma associated with
certain sexual acts that have formed societal and judicial as-
sumptions about homosexuality. The legal reasoning behind
child custody determinations based on the "best interest of the
CHANGE 907 (1986); Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, 11
U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 327 (1986); Sheppard, Lesbian Mothers II: Long Night's Journey
Into Day, 8 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REV. 219 (1985); and Comment, Assessing Children's Best
Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward A Rational Custody Standard, 32
UCLA L. REV. 852 (1985) (authored by Steve Susoeff).
3. The number of single custodial fathers almost tripled between 1970 and 1983.
In 1983 the number was estimated to be nearly 600,000 fathers with sole responsi-
bility of at least one child 18 years old or younger. There is every indication that
this number, which has almost tripled since 1970, will continue to rise as men seek
out the role of sole parent following a marital breakup and as women continue to
define themselves in ways that are less "maternally oriented."
Greif, Single Fathers Rearing Children, J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 185 (Feb. 1985) (quoting
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Series P-20, No. 388 Current Population
Rt. Series, Household and Family Characteristics: March 1983 7 (May 1984)).
4. The exact number of gay fathers in the United States is unknown but "approxi-
mately four million homosexual men and women in the United States can be projected
to have entered matrimony... [and] about forty percent of all homosexual spouses have
had children from their unions." SLOAN, HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT AND THE LAW 31 (1987).
Extrapolating from these figures, there are approximately 1.6 million homosexual par-
ents in the United States.
Weinberg estimated that one in five homosexual males has been married and "[i]t is
believed that up to a quarter of self-identified gay men father children." Skeen & Robin-
son, supra note 2, at 999.
5. In recent years, lesbians and gay parents have become more willing to risk the
disclosure of their sexual orientation in an attempt to obtain child custody. Hitchens,
supra note 2, at 89. Roberta Achtenberg, Directing Attorney of the Lesbian Rights Pro-
ject, has observed that "[t]he most commonly litigated conflict involving the issue of
sexual orientation involves the rights of lesbians and gay men to the custody of and
visitation with their children ... born to them as a result of heterosexual relationships
and marriages." ACHTENBERG, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 1-7 (1987).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss1/4
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child" standard' is discussed in Part III. Part IV describes ob-
stacles as well as the implicit assumptions traditionally encoun-
tered by a homosexual parent seeking child custody. A review of
the decisional authority for the determination of the "best inter-
est of the child" where one parent is a gay father is presented in
Part V.
A conclusion is offered in Part VI that New York's deci-
sional law on the resolution of child custody disputes represents
a progressive trend in legal reasoning. This Comment further
concludes that a parent's sexual orientation should become a
factor in a custody dispute only where that orientation has a
demonstrated adverse effect on a child's best interest.7 This
Comment categorically rejects the holdings implicit in certain
court decisions that a parent's homosexual orientation renders
that parent unfit.
II. Historical Background
One cannot begin to understand judicial determinations of
child custody where a homosexual parent is involved without an
adequate appreciation of the social and cultural attitudes under-
lying biases toward individuals with a same sex orientation. A
comprehension of the effect of stereotypical attributions on
these decisions is also necessary.'
A. The Evolution of Anti-Homosexual Attitudes
Modern intolerance to homosexuality is premised on ancient
Judeo-Christian proscriptions against the odious and "sinful"9
6. See infra notes 49-80 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 197-221 and accompanying text.
8. "Our own is one of the comparatively few societies which condemns homosexual-
ity in all forms." Basile, supra note 2, at 3 n.1. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 133-
36 (1977) (cross-cultural studies).
9. Religious justification for sanctioning homosexual expression is based on the as-
sumption that homosexuality is detrimental to society because it is nonprocreative and
unnatural. See J. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY 8-16
(1980) (general authority pro and con). West, supra note 11,.at 119-32. Others have char-
acterized homosexual behavior as immoral and point to the Scriptures of the Bible for
validation. See generally MAGNUSON, ARE GAY RIGHTS RIGHT? 59-60 (1985) (biblical ref-
erences purportedly condemning homosexuality). See also Gilbert, Conceptions of Ho-
mosexuality and Sodomy in Western History, 6 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 57, 62-63 (1980-
1981) (condemnations of sodomy in the writings of clergy and penitentials). Contra
1989]
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act of sodomy.1" While homosexuality is not synonymous with
particular sex acts, historically the social stigma attached to
these acts has been assigned to individuals with a same sex
orientation.1
It has been observed that "homosexuality" and "homosex-
ual" are modern terms, having originated in the late nineteenth
century. 2 Indeed, the word "homosexual" was itself devised by
nineteenth century doctors who combined the Greek word for
"same" and the Latin wod for "sex."' 3 "This linguistic develop-
ment stemmed not from some arbitrary desire to find a new
word to replace the earlier ones, but rather from the recent crea-
tion by society of a new class of deviants." 4 The distinction is
an important one, as it "marks the beginning of the treatment of
a segment of the population as a race apart."'"
Over a protracted period of time, mental health profession-
als embraced in toto religious proscriptions against homosexual
contact and equated homosexuality with mental illness."6 Psy-
chological and social science research focused almost exclusively
Tivnan, Homosexuals and the Churches, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at
89 ("'[tlhere is no condemnation of loving homosexual actions anywhere in
Scriptures.' ").
10. "The words 'sodomy' and 'sodomite' had dual meanings. On the one hand sod-
omy referred to unspecified sexual relations between males, and on the other it meant a
particular mode of sexuality, usually anal sex." Gilbert, supra note 9, at 62. West, supra
note 8, at 120 (origins of the word sodomite).
11. D'Emilio, Making and Unmaking Minorities: The Tensions Between Gay Polit-
ics and History, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 915, 918 (1986) (highlighting distinc-
tions between sexual acts and sexual identity).
12. Gilbert, supra note 9, at 61.
13. Tivnan, supra note 9, at 89.
14. Gilbert, supra note 9, at 61. Deviant behavior is that which "violates social
norms." A. CRIDEI, G. GOETHALs, R. KAVANAUGH, & P. SOLOMON, PSYCHOLOGY 517 (1983).
"Deviance itself then can be seen as a moralistically created category made by the major-
ity for that minority of which it disapproves." Basile, supra note 2, at 8.
15. Gilbert, supra note 9, at 61. "Sex becomes the distinguishing characteristic that
describes the essential nature of some men and women. No longer simply an act, homo-
sexual behavior instead serves as a marker of identity. That identity encompasses per-
sonality, emotional state, sexual desire, and even according to some, physical characteris-
tics." D'Emilio, supra note 11, at 917.
16. Basile, supra note 2, at 4, 7. "Ancient Judeo-Christian prohibitions against ho-
mosexuality were based on homophobia, and present-day psychiatrists and other mental
health 'experts' have grounded their research on the same biased point of view." Id. at 3.
See also Hudson & Ricketts, A Strategy For The Measurement of Homophobia, 5 J. OF
HOMOSEXUALrrY 357 (Summer 1980) (homosexuality equated with physiological and psy-
chological illness).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss1/4
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on ascertaining the etiology of homosexuality17 without ques-
tioning the underlying premise that homosexual behavior is dis-
ordered behavior.18 Following a period of gay activism,19 the
American Psychiatric Association voted unanimously in 1974 to
remove homosexuality per se from the Association's list of psy-
chiatric disorders.2 0 Today, the Association's Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual III clearly states that homosexuality does not
constitute a mental disorder.21
B. The Legal Posture Towards Homosexuality
The treatment of homosexuals by the American legal sys-
tem parallels and in many instances reflects the religious2 and
psychological epithets of homosexuality as immoral23 and patho-
17. Contradicting theories have been proposed to explain the origins of homosexual
behavior. Freud and subsequent psychoanalysts proceeded under the assumption that
homosexuality was a sexual aberration and attributed homosexual behavior to un-
resolved Oedipal conflicts. See SOCARIDES, HOMOSEXUALITY 1-191 (1978) (general discus-
sion of Freud's contribution to the understanding of the etiology of homosexual behav-
ior). Social learning theorists explained homosexual behavior as the outcome of early
childhood conditioning and role-modeling. See WEST, supra note 8, at 110-15 (review of
social learning theory). Still other research correlates homosexual behavior with genetic
and prenatal factors. See Green, The Best Interests of the Child with a Lesbian Mother,
10 AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 7, 7-9 (1982) (brief discussion of genetic, prenatal, Freu-
dian, and social learning explanations of homosexual behavior).
18. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 220.
19. The gay activists emphasized liberation in the 1960's and this emphasis shifted
to a struggle for gay rights in the 1970's and 1980's. See E. RUEDA, THE HOMOSEXUAL
NETWORK 75-239 (1982) (thorough discussion of the ideology, organization, and goals of
the gay movement from its inception); J. KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY (1976) (compila-
tions of writings and poems on the history of the homosexual experience in America).
20. Green, supra note 17, at 9-10.
21. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DSM-III: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 380 (3d ed. 1980).
22. "Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to
state intervention throughout the history of Western Civilization. Condemnation of those
practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards." Bowers v.
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring).
23. For example, the United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed a district
court upholding the constitutionality of Virginia's criminal sodomy statute premised on
the showing that homosexuality "is likely to end in a contribution to moral delin-
quency." Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D.
Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). "ITihe State is not required to show that moral
delinquency actually results from homosexuality. It is enough for upholding the legisla-
tion to establish that the conduct is likely to end in a contribution to moral delin-
quency." Id.
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logical.24 In Colonial America "buggery" statutes were enacted
which criminalized certain sexual acts between men.25 These
statutes imposed inordinate penalties when contrasted with the
penalties imposed for other sexual offenses.26 Remnants of these
buggery statutes are still present in many states today.2 7 Twenty
eight states28 still have sodomy statutes which criminalize
24. Basile, supra note 2, at 11. See also Knutson, Homosexuality And The Law, 5 J.
OF HOMOSExuALITY 4 (1979-1980) (the United States has "the most fervently anti-homo-
sexual laws in the Western World.").
25. Virginia passed the first buggery statute in 1792 which provided in pertinent
part: "[I]f any do commit the detestable and abominable vice of Buggery, with man or
beast, he or she so offending, shall be adjudged a felon, and shall suffer death, as in case
of felony, without benefit of Clergy." Oaks, Perceptions of Homosexuality By Justices of
the Peace in Colonial Virginia, 5 J. OF HOMOSEXuALiTY 35, 38 (1979-80) (quoting A Col-
lection of All Such Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia . . . Now in Force 179
(Richmond 1803)).
"In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in
the Union had criminal sodomy laws." Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844-45 n.6
(1986).
26. The penalty for sodomy was one to ten years in prison. Bigamy carried the pen-
alty of six months to two years. Adultery was punishable by a fine of twenty dollars.
Fornication resulted in a ten dollar fine. Oaks, supra note 25, at 39-40.
27. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). The Georgia criminal sodomy statute
provides:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of an-
other. A person commits the offense of aggravated sodomy when he commits sod-
omy with force and against the will of the other person.
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprison-
ment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. A person convicted of the
offense of aggravated sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for life or by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.
Id.
Similar criminal sodomy statutes are introduced at child custody proceedings as in-
dicia that the gay parent seeking custody is unfit. See Fort v. Fort, 12 Mass. App. Ct.
411, 425 N.E.2d 754 (1981) (violation of criminal sodomy statute immaterial); J.L.P.(H.)
v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (Missouri criminal sodomy statute intro-
duced in assessing gay father's fitness); DiStefano v. DiStefano, 60 A.D.2d 976, 401
N.Y.S.2d 637 (4th Dep't 1978) (criminal sodomy statute did not render parent unfit per
se); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 344 Pa. Super. 49, 56, 496 A.2d 1, 4 (1985) (Pennsylvania
criminal sodomy statute used to define homosexual relationships as "deviant"); Doe v.
Doe, 222 Va. 736, 746, 284 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1981) (Virginia criminal sodomy statute does
not provide basis to render parent unfit). But in such cases, the criminalization of con-
sensual sodomy has been viewed as one factor bearing on fitness, not a reason sufficient,
in itself, to find a parent unfit per se. E.g., J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d at 869.
28. The following states still have criminal sodomy statutes: Alabama (ALA. CODE §§
13A-6-63, 13A-6-64 (1975)); Arizona (ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (1978));
District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss1/4
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sodomous conduct between consenting adults.2"
It is important to note, however, that a few states have leg-
islatively decriminalized private consensual sexual expression
between competent adults.30 Moreover, a handful of state courts
have invalidated consensual sodomy statutes on state constitu-
tional grounds. 31 People v. Onofre3 2 involved a New York statute
800.02 (West 1976)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1988)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-
6605 (1987)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1981)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 510.070-510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.89
(West 1986)); Maryland (MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553, 554 (1987)); Massachusetts
(MAss. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 34 (1986)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750-158 (West
1968)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987)); Mississippi (MIss. CODE
ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972)); Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.090.1(3) (1979)); Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1987)); Nevada (NEy. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1987)); New
York (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1987)) (New York Court of Appeals declared
unconstitutional in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177
(1987)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886) (West 1983)); Pennsylvania (PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 18-3124 (Purdon 1983 & Supp.)) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court de-
clared unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980));
Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1981)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-
120 (Law. Co-op. 1985)); Texas (TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974)) (federal
district court declared Texas criminal sodomy statute unconstitutional in Baker v. Wade,
553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1978 & Supp.
1988)); and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1988)) (constitutionality of Virginia's
criminal sodomy statute upheld in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403
F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)).
29. These sodomy statutes have been primarily enforced against homosexual males.
AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN REAGAN'S AMERICA 49 (Oct. 1982) (special
two-year report on ACLU's defense of the Bill of Rights).
30. The following states have decriminalized sodomy between consenting competent
adults: Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 11.40.120 (1985) (repealed 1978)); California (CAL. PENAL
CODE § 286 (West 1988) (amended 1986)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-66 (1985)
(repealed 1975)); Hawaii (HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 707-733, 707-734, 707-735 (1985) (amended
1986)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14-2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) (amended 1983));
Ohio (OHIO REy. CODE ANN. §§ 163.385, 163.395, 163.405 (Anderson 1987)); Oregon (OR.
REV. STAT. § 167.040 (1987) (repealed 1971)); and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.01
(West 1982) (repealed 1976)).
31. E.g., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (declaring New York State's criminal sodomy statute uncon-
stitutional); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980) (Pennsylvania
Supreme Court declared criminal sodomy statute unconstitutional). Cf. Baker v. Wade,
553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (precedential value of holding unclear where district
court declared Texas criminal sodomy law unconstitutional). Contra Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), af'd, 425 U.S. 901
(1976) (Virginia's criminal sodomy statute upheld as constitutional by federal district
court and affirmed by United States Supreme Court).
32. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
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which criminalized private consensual sexual acts between
nonmarried persons but permitted the same sodomous conduct
between married persons.33 The New York Court of Appeals,
with one judge dissenting, ruled that the law had no rational re-
lationship to any legitimate government interest where the stat-
ute served no purpose "other than [to] restrict individual con-
duct and impose a concept of private morality chosen by the
State. 3 4 The majority further found the New York statute vio-
lated the equal protection mandate of the fourteenth amend-
ment since "the Penal Law on its face discriminates between
married and unmarried persons ...."35
The Supreme Court was most recently called upon to con-
sider the constitutional validity of a state's criminal sodomy
statute in Bowers v. Hardwick."e The Court, in an opinion by
Justice White, found the Constitution does not confer upon
homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. 7 Justice
987 (1981).
33. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1987). The New York consensual sodomy
statute provides: "A person is guilty of consensual sodomy when he engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with another person." Id. Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as:
"[S]exual conduct between persons not married to each other consisting of contact be-
tween the penis and the anus, the mouth and penis, or the mouth and the vulva." Id. §
130.00(2).
34. 51 N.Y.2d at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952. The majority opinion
concluded that
the People have failed to demonstrate how government interference with the prac-
tice of personal choice in matters of intimate sexual behavior out of view of the
public and with no commercial component will serve to advance the cause of pub-
lic morality .... [T]here has been no showing of any threat, either to participants
or the public in general, in consequence of the voluntary engagement by adults in
private, discreet, sodomous conduct.
Id.
One commentator has, however, questioned the precedential value of this decision in
light of the AIDS epidemic. "The emergence of AIDS as a widespread disease among
men who practice homosexual sex which is essentially sodomistic raises the public health
issue which always gives the state power to regulate even personal conduct." SLOAN,
supra note 4, at 9.
35. 51 N.Y.2d at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
36. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (5-4 decision considering the constitutionality of Georgia's
criminal sodomy statute). See supra note 29.
37. 106 S. Ct. at 2843. Justice White narrowly defined the issue presented in Bowers.
The Court expressly reserved the "question about the right or propriety of state legisla-
tive decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual sodomy, or of state court
decisions invalidating those laws on state constitutional grounds." Id.
In the opinion of Justice Blackmun, dissenting, the majority "distorted" the issue
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss1/4
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White's opinions" cited historical proscriptions against sodomy
as proof that homosexual activity is not a private and intimate
association protected by the federal constitution. 9 The majority
concluded that the Georgia statute bore a rational relationship
to the state's interest in precluding "immoral and unacceptable"
sexual expression.4 0 While gay rights activists had sought a deci-
sion recognizing the rights of a homosexual minority,4 1 the
United States Supreme Court upheld the Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults in private.42
Homosexuality still meets with enmity on the part of the
law in several different contexts. In addition to criminal penal-
ties for sexual expression, homosexuals have been denied legal
protections in the military,'4 employment," and immigration. 45
before the Court and "almost obsessive[ly] focus[ed] on homosexual activity." Id. at
2848-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, this case did not present
the question of whether homosexuals have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy, but
rather whether an individual's right to privacy (heterosexual or homosexual) or right to
intimate association is unconstitutionally encroached upon when the Georgia criminal
sodomy statute is enforced. Id. at 2849.
38. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell each filed separate concurring opinions.
Justice Blackmun, Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens dissented.
39. Id. at 2844. "Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden
by the laws of the original thirteen States when they ratified the Bill of Rights." Id.
As with the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger's concurrence relied heavily on
historical proscriptions against sodomy in concluding that the act of homosexual sodomy
is not a protected fundamental right. Justice Burger reasoned "[t]o hold that the act of
homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside
millennia of moral teaching." Id. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens, in their respective dissents, argued that the
evidence of historical condemnations of sodomy as immoral should not become the con-
stitutional standard for evaluating state statutes regulating private consensual sexual be-
havior among adults. Id. at 2848, 2857 (Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting). Ac-
cording to Justice Blackmun:
The assertion that "traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe" the conduct in-
volved . . .cannot provide an adequate justification for [Georgia's sodomy stat-
ute]. ... The legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on whether the
State can advance some justification for its law beyond its conformity to religious
doctrine.
Id. at 2854-55.
40. Id at 2846.
41. Rothberg, Preface to Symposium: Sex, Politics & The Law: Lesbian & Gay Men
Take The Offense, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 891 (1986).
42. 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
43. E.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579
(1984) (Naval officer discharged for homosexual behavior and discharge upheld). For a
discussion of homosexuality and the military, see SLOAN, supra note 4, at 27. "U.S. mili-
19891
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Homophobia"I has been a source of confusion and contra-
dictions in the American legal system. "It is blatant in providing
criminal penalties for homosexual activities. It is subtle and con-
fusing when manifested in the failure to report cases dealing
with homosexuality. More often it is thinly disguised in legal
'reasoning' and general maxims like fitness, best interest and
moral character. '47
III. The Best Interest of the Child Standard
Married persons enjoy equal powers and rights as joint
guardians of their children."8 Upon dissolution of the marriage,
these powers and rights become secondary to the needs and in-
terests of their children.4" While courts have limited authority to
interfere with parental decisions regarding the welfare of chil-
dren during marriage, 50 upon dissolution of the marriage, courts
are often asked to determine which of the two competing cus-
tary regulations prohibit servicemen and women from engaging in private consensual ho-
mosexual relations. Such activity in the military can be a court-martial offense as a viola-
tion of Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)." Id.
Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides:
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation
with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of
sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense.
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct.
10 U.S.C. § 925 (1983).
44. For a thorough discussion of sexual orientation and employment practices, see
ACHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 5-1. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d
327 (9th Cir. 1979) (discrimination based on sexual orientation not covered by Title VII,
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
45. E.g., Hill v. I.N.S., 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (considered exclusion based on
admitted homosexuality); see generally SLOAN, supra note 4, at 45-49 (discussing homo-
sexual aliens and immigration discrimination).
46. Homophobia "is defined as an irrational fear or intolerance of homosexuality or
homosexual persons." Herek, On Heterosexual Masculinity, 29 Am. BEHAV. SCIENIST
563 (1986).
47. Basile, supra note 2, at 5.
48. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 81 (McKinney 1988). Section 81 provides: "A married
woman is a joint guardian of her children with her husband, with equal powers, rights
and duties in regard to them." Id.
49. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1986). See, e.g., In re Jane B., 85 Misc. 2d
523, 527, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1976).
50. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (state may only terminate a
parent's rights when it establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the parental
relationship harms the child).
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tody contestants can best foster and encourage the growth and
welfare of the offspring of the marriage."
A. The Common-Law Development
At common law a father enjoyed a prima facie right to child
custody.52 With the advent of urbanization, the suffragette
movement, and Freudian psychology in the early twentieth cen-
tury,5 3 the primacy of the paternal right to custody was chal-
lenged.5 4 In a 1912 decision, Ullman v. Ullman,55 the common-
law rule favoring paternal custody was overruled.56 The court
reasoned that "[t]he child at tender age is entitled to have such
care, love and discipline as only a good and devoted mother can
usually give."' 57 Thus, a judicial presumption arose that unless
proven unfit, a mother could best provide for and nurture a
child of "tender years. '58
51. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240(1) (McKinney 1986). The Supreme Court of the State
of New York possesses jurisdiction pursuant to N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney
1977). Section 70 provides: "Where a minor is residing within this state, either parent
may apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such minor child
brought before such court [for a custody determination]." Id. For a discussion of the
New York Supreme Court's jurisdictional basis for consideration of custody cases, see S.
WOHL KRAM & N. FRANK, THE LAW OF CHILD CUSTODY: DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBSTAN-
TIVE LAW 1-13 (1982).
52. "If the husband is in all respects fit and proper to have the care of the child and
to superintend its education, and other things are equal between the two, the recognized
paramount right of the father must prevail over the otherwise equal claims of the
mother." Ullman v. Ullman, 151 A.D. 419, 424, 135 N.Y.S. 1080, 1082 (2d Dep't 1912)
(quoting People ex rel. Brooks v. Brooks, 35 Barb. 85 (1861)).
53. Greif, supra note 3, at 186.
54. In People ex rel. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 91 A.D. 322, 86 N.Y.S. 539 (1st Dep't 1904),
the New York Supreme Court considered a challenge to a father's prima facie right to
child custody. The court specifically confirmed "the undoubted rule that the husband is
regarded in the law as the head of the household and the law awards to him the care and
the custody of the children, and charges upon him the duty of their proper care and
maintenance . I..." d  at 325, 86 N.Y.S. at 541. Nonetheless, the court still retained the
authority "to award the care and custody of young infants to the wife [mother], as
against the paramount right of the husband [father] where the wife has shown herself to
be a proper person and is able to fully discharge her duty toward the child." Id.
55. 151 A.D. 419, 135 N.Y.S. 1080 (2d Dep't 1912).
56. Id. at 424-25, 135 N.Y.S. at 1083.
57. Id.
58. A preference for maternal custody for a child of tender years emerged subse-
quent to the Ullman decision. In State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350
N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1973), decided some 60 years after Ullman, the
vitality of the tender years presumption was considered. The court commented on the
11
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New York unequivocally rejected a presumption in favor of
either parent in State ex rel. Watts v. Watts 9 in 1973. The
court stated "the 'tender years presumption' should be dis-
carded because it is based on outdated social stereotypes rather
than on rational and up-to-date consideration of the welfare of
the children involved." 0 The court in Watts further concluded
this sex-based presumption violated the equal protection guar-
antee of the Constitution.0 The proper consideration, the court
stressed, is the welfare of the child."2
B. The Statutory Standard
Today, a New York court making a child custody determi-
nation derives broad discretionary power from the "best interest
of the child" standard s embodied in New York's Domestic Rela-
tions Law, sections 70 and 240.64 Both sections 70 and 240 pro-
vide in part: "In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to
"pattern of at least cursory invocation by the courts in New York and elsewhere, of the
presumption that children of tender years, all other things being equal, should be given
into the custody of their mother." 77 Misc. 2d at 179-80, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 287. This court
recognized that "in well over 90% of the cases adjudicated, the mother is awarded cus-
tody." Id. at 179, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
59. 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
60. Id. at 181, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 288. The court reasoned that "[tihe simple fact of
being a mother does not, by itself, indicate a capacity or willingness to render a quality
of care different from that which the father can provide." Id. at 181, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
61. Id. at 182, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 290. The court reasoned that such an arbitrary pre-
sumption based on gender was "suspect" and subject to judicial scrutiny. Id. at 182-83,
350 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
62. 77 Misc. at 182, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
63. The best interest standard was first articulated by Judge Cardozo in Finlay v.
Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925). "The chancellor ... acts as parens
patriae to do what is best for the interest of the child. He is to put himself in the posi-
tion of a 'wise, affectionate and careful parent,' and make provision for the child accord-
ingly." Id. (citation omitted). See also, DiStefano v. DiStefano, 60 A.D.2d 976, 977, 401
N.Y.S.2d 636, 638 (4th Dep't 1978) (applying best interest standard). Cf. Guinan v.
Guinan, 102 A.D.2d 963, 963-64, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830, 831 (3d Dep't 1984) (discretion of
judges must have "sound and substantial basis in the record examined in light of 'the
best interest of the child.' ") (emphasis added).
64. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 70, 240 (McKinney 1988 & 1986). Section 240, dealing
with child custody in matrimonial proceedings, provides in part: "[T]he court must give
such direction ... for the custody, care, education and maintenance of any child of the
parties, as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances
of the case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the child." Id. § 240.
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the custody of the child in either parent."65 Section 70 further
provides that "the court shall determine solely what is for the
best interest of the child, and what will best promote its welfare
and happiness and make award accordingly.""
The goal of a nisi prius court making a child custody deter-
mination is to interpret the construction of these sections to as-
certain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Indeed,
case law would support the proposition that the New York Leg-
islature intended to protect the interests and needs of children.6
The court, in making a custody determination, acts as parens
patriaes for the child, rendering the interests of the competing
adults meaningful only to the extent that those interests reflect
the best interest of the child."
C. Judicial Interpretations of the Statutory Standard
Since section 70 and section 240 provide a broad standard
for child custody determinations, a judicial standard has evolved
for determining which set of factors and policy considerations is
pertinent in assessing the best interests of the child. There is no
fixed formula, however, for weighing the multitude of facts
presented by competing parents.70
A New York court examines the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the case, 71 including the circumstances of
65. Id. § 240.
66. Id. § 70. Section 70 deals with child custody in habeas corpus proceedings. Id.
67. See, e.g., Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d 765, 447
N.Y.S.2d 893 (1982); Pawelski v. Bucholtz, 91 A.D.2d 1200, 459 N.Y.S.2d 190 (4th Dep't
1983); DiStefano v. DiStefano, 60 A.D.2d 976, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 (4th Dep't 1978); Saun-
ders v. Saunders, 60 A.D.2d 701, 400 N.Y.S.2d 588 (3d Dep't 1977); Feldman v. Feldman,
45 A.D.2d 320, 358 N.Y.S.2d 507 (2d Dep't 1974); In re Jane B., 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380
N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1976).
68. Parens patriae, in this limited context, refers to the court's power to protect
children who are deemed unable to protect themselves. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 787 (2d ed. 1988).
69. "The Court, with respect to custody disputes, acts as 'parens patriae.' It looks at
the total picture and attempts to consider and weigh all factors in determining what is
for the best interest of the child." In re Jane B., 85 Misc. 2d at 526, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 859
(citation omitted).
70. See, e.g., Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d 765, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893. "The
only absolute in the law governing custody of children is that there are no absolutes." Id.
at 93, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
71. Id. at 95, 432 N.E.2d at 768, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
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the respective parents, and anticipates which parent can best
provide for the child's emotional and intellectual development,
care, and guidance." While no single factor is determinative in
evaluating the best interest of the child,73 a number of factors
and judicial preferences emerge from New York case law.
Factors considered relevant in evaluating the best interest
of the child include
the care and affection shown; the stability of the respective par-
ents; the atmosphere of the homes; the ability and availability of
the parents; the morality of the parents; the prospective educa-
tional opportunities; the possible effect of custodial change on the
children; the financial standing of the parents; and parents' past
performance .... 74
The sexual lifestyle of a parent is deemed to be one among
several pertinent factors to be considered when awarding cus-
tody.75 The issue of the effect of a parent's sexual lifestyle upon
72. Louise E.S. v. W. Stephen S., 64 N.Y.2d 946, 477 N.E.2d 1091, 488 N.Y.S.2d 637
(1985).
73. See supra note 70.
74. Saunders v. Saunders, 60 A.D. 2d 701, 400 N.Y.S.2d 588 (3d Dep't 1977). For
cases discussing some of the factors considered relevant to evaluating the child's best
interest, see Louise E.S. v. W. Stephen S., 64 N.Y.2d 946, 477 N.E.2d 1091, 488 N.Y.S.2d
637 (1985) (considering quality of home environment and ability of parent to provide for
child's intellectual development); Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d 765, 447
N.Y.S.2d 893 (1982) (considering mother's involvement in adulterous relationship con-
trary to the tenets of Orthodox Judaism); Obey v. Degling, 37 N.Y.2d 768, 337 N.E.2d
601, 375 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1975) (custodial relationship should be maintained on a long-term
basis); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 117 A.D.2d 709, 498 N.Y.S.2d 852 (2d Dep't 1986) (court consid-
ered that while both parents were employed, mother had more time to spend with chil-
dren); Pawelski v. Bucholtz, 91 A.D.2d 1201, 459 N.Y.S.2d 190 (4th Dep't 1983)
(mother's "warm" and "loving" relationship with son considered); Wallinger v. Wallin-
ger, 96 A.D.2d 988, 466 N.Y.S.2d 826 (3d Dep't 1983) (financial status of each parent
relevant); Thomas J.D. v. Catharine K.D., 79 A.D.2d 1015, 435 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't
1981) (court noted that mother suffered from manic depressive episodes); Saunders, 60
A.D.2d 701, 400 N.Y.S.2d 588 (relevant that custodial mother and children live in home
of mother's male companion with whom mother had adulterous relationship); Feldman v.
Feldman, 45 A.D.2d 320, 358 N.Y.S.2d 507 (2d Dep't 1974) (noting custodial mother's
sexual relations with a married man); State ex rel. Rodolfo "CC" v. Susan "CC," 37
A.D.2d 657, 322 N.Y.S.2d 388 (3d Dep't 1971) (moral turpitude of mother who had male
visitors); M.A.B. v. R.B., 134 Misc. 2d 317, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
1986) (considering that mother's severe health problems caused her to be hospitalized 80
times over a ten-year period); State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d
285 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1973) (past performance of parent considered).
75. KRAM & FRANK, supra note 53, at 43-45.
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that parent's fitness to have the care and custody of a minor
child has been addressed in many cases. 6 Despite the fact that
New York courts will consider a parent's extramarital heterosex-
ual activity, such activity alone does not constitute sufficient
grounds for the denial of custody.7
The determination of the best interest of the child reflects
the court's evaluation of many diverse factors, yet a trial court's
custody award is virtually final.7 8 Deference is given to court de-
cisions "[s]ince the trial court is in the best position to assess
the testimony, observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties
and witnesses and resolve credibility .... ,79 Appellate review is
limited to those instances in which a litigant can establish that
the trial court's findings "lack a sound basis or are contrary to
the weight of the credible evidence." 80
76. Saunders, 60 A.D.2d 701, 400 N.Y.S.2d 588, (custodial mother and children lived
in home of mother's male companion); Repetti v. Repetti, 50 A.D.2d 913, 377 N.Y.S.2d
571 (2d Dep't 1975) (father lived with woman whom he intended to marry following
divorce); Feldman, 45 A.D.2d 320, 358 N.Y.S.2d 507 (custodial mother's sexual relations
with a married man); State ex rel. Rodolfo "CC," 37 A.D.2d 657, 322 N.Y.S.2d 388 (con-
duct of mother who had overnight male visitors did not render her unfit for custody).
77. E.g., Feldman, 45 A.D.2d 320, 358 N.Y.S.2d 507. "[A]morality, immorality, sex-
ual deviation and what we conveniently consider aberrant sexual practices do not ipso
facto constitute unfitness for custody." Id. at 322, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
Cases from foreign jurisdictions also uphold the general rule that a parent who en-
gages in an adulterous relationship is not automatically deprived of custodial rights by
virtue of this conduct. Cases dealing with the issue of extramarital heterosexual relation-
ships include: Claughton v. Claughton, 344 So. 2d 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (one
factor considered among several); Burris v. Burris, 70 Ill. App. 3d 503, 388 N.E.2d 811
(1979) (must prove conduct has adverse effect upon child to modify a custodial provi-
sion); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 256 Ind. 119, 267 N.E.2d 155 (1971) (adulterous wife not
deprived of custody by virtue of such conduct); Tapal v. Tapal, 448 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1969) (extramarital heterosexual activity relevant but not controlling factor);
and J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978) (parent's heterosexual relationship is not
relevant unless the relationship reflects on parenting ability). See generally 24 AM. JUR.
2d Divorce and Separation § 966 (1983); and 23 A.L.R.3d 38 (1969).
78. Rivera, supra note 2, at 329. "Custody cases are fact intensive .... Because
[custody] cases are so fact intensive, appeal is difficult and success on appeal is unlikely.
Few issues of law really exist, and appellate courts are loathe to overturn lower court
decisions unless a 'gross abuse of discretion' is shown." Id. at 854-55. Generally federal
courts will not take jurisdiction of custody matters. See Comment, supra note 2, at 854-
55.
79. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 120 A.D.2d 983, 503 N.Y.S.2d 466, 467 (4th Dep't
1986).
80. Id. See also State ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895
(1952).
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IV. The 'Case' Against Gay Parenting
A. Introducing the Gay Parenting Issue
Historical assumptions and attitudes"1 regarding both ho-
mosexuality and homosexual parents have taken many forms in
child custody proceedings."2 The issue of a parent's homosexual-
ity may arise in a custody dispute in one of two ways. First, a
parent's sexual orientation may be introduced as one factor to
be considered in assessing the best interest of the child in the
initial custody dispute.8 3 Second, a parent may petition for a
change of custody based on changed circumstances when that
parent learns of the competing parent's same sex orientation. 4
B. Debunking Myths About Gay Parenting
A number of arguments are proffered to trial courts to jus-
tify the denial of child custody to homosexual parents. These
arguments are premised on the assumption that homosexual
lifestyles generate the following: "(1) an increased likelihood for
the child to become homosexual; (2) a likelihood for social
stigma or child-peer rejection due to parental homosexuality; (3)
a likelihood for the homosexual liaison to allow little time for
ongoing [parent]-child interaction; and (4) the increased likeli-
81. See supra notes 8-47 and accompanying text.
82. For related views on homosexual parenting, see Basile, supra note 2, at 4-11;
Note, supra note 2, at 1034-39; Comment, supra note 2, at 876-92; Rivera, supra note 2,
at 329; and Sheppard, supra note 2, at 236-37.
83. See Comment, supra note 2, at 857-58; and Rivera, supra note 2, at 328.
84. In re Jane B., 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1976) (father successfully petitioned for change of custody due to mother's suspected
and later confirmed homosexuality); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981)
(father successfully moved to modify divorce decree awarding custody to mother living
openly in lesbian relationship); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982) (mother's
open lesbian relationship constituted a sufficient change of circumstances to warrant
change of child custody order and transfer custody to father).
While some courts have concluded that the disclosure of a parent's homosexual ori-
entation constitutes a sufficient change of circumstance to order a transfer of custody,
other courts have rejected efforts to transfer custody based on the same disclosure. E.g.,
M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 404 A.2d 1256 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (mother's
sexual preference did not support transfer of custody where there was no showing of
changed circumstances affecting the welfare of the child); and Schuster v. Schuster, 90
Wash. 2d 626, 585 P.2d 130 (1978) (trial court order denying a change of custody based
on custodial mother's homosexuality affirmed).
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hood for child psychopathology."8
1. The Homosexual Offspring Myth
The first argument is based on the assumption that children
raised by homosexual parents will develop a homosexual orienta-
tion themselves."6 The empirical research, however, indicates
"that gay fathers and lesbian mothers do not negatively affect
the sexual identity of their offspring.""7 One well-controlled
comparison study88 revealed that no statistically significant dif-
ference exists between the sexual identity of children raised by
lesbian mothers and those raised by heterosexual mothers.89 In
fact, many researchers have determined that the gender identity
and sex role behavior of children raised by homosexuals is fun-
damentally heterosexual.90
85. Kleber, supra note 2, at 82.
86. Note, supra note 2, at 1035-36; Gottsfield, Child Custody and Sexual Lifestyle,
23 CONCuIIATION CTS. REV. 43, 44 (June 1985); Hitchens, supra note 2, at 90; Kleber,
supra note 2, at 82; and Rivera, supra note 2, at 329. See, e.g., In re Jane B., 85 Misc. 2d
515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (fear that child might "emulate" her mother's homosexual
lifestyle).
Inherent in this argument is the societal belief that a heterosexual lifestyle is prefer-
able to a homosexual lifestyle. This argument rejects by negative implication the notion
that a homosexual lifestyle is an equally viable alternate lifestyle. Hitchens, supra note
2, at 91.
87. Skeen & Robinson, supra note 2, at 1000.
88. Green, supra note 17, at 7.
89. Id. at 14.
90. For example, a study was conducted contrasting the gender identity of children
raised by heterosexual and homosexual mothers and found no significant differences be-
tween the two groups. Kirkpatrick, Smith & Roy, Lesbian Mothers and Their Children:
A Comparative Study, 51 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545 (July 1981) (hereinafter Kirk-
patrick). Kirkpatrick, et. al., discovered that "lesbian mothers and heterosexual mothers
were very much alike in their marital and maternal interests, current life-styles, and
child-rearing practices." Id. at 550.
In 1979, psychiatrist Richard Green conducted a preliminary descriptive study to
assess the sexual identity of children raised by homosexual parents. Dr. Green noted that
in virtually all cases, the children developed a heterosexual orientation. Green, Sexual
Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PsY-
CHIATRY 692, 696 (June 1978). See also Miller, Gay Fathers and Their Children, 28 FAM.
COORDINATOR 544, 544-52 (1979) (no evidence that gay fathers negatively affect their
children's gender identity); and Kleber, supra note 2, at 81-86 (review of the literature
pertinent to the sexual identity of children raised by homosexuals).
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2. The Alienation of Peers Myth
The next contention raised by opponents of child custody
awards to homosexual parents is that children in the custody of
homosexual parents will be ostracized and rejected by their
peers. 1 Studies indicate that in households headed by divorced
lesbian and divorced heterosexual mothers, no significant differ-
ence exists between the level of peer teasing and the rejection
experienced by children.2
Even if a child did experience peer rejection due to parental
homosexuality, the denial of custody to the homosexual parent
would not abate the problem.93 Such stigmatization or peer re-
jection is not associated with the fact that the child resides with
the homosexual parent, but with the fact that the child has a
homosexual parent.94 One New York court has held that peer
"taunting, teasing and ostracism '"" does not provide an ade-
quate basis for denying child custody since it is not the role of
any court to give effect to private bias and societal prejudice.9"
91. M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1982) (court concerned with peer teas-
ing about mother's homosexual orientation and affirmed award of custody to father); L.
v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (children teased about lesbian mother
and court added new restrictions to mother's visitation privileges); and Jacobson v.
Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) (children might suffer from "slings and arrows"
of disapproving society). See also, Kleber, supra note 2, at 82; and Hitchens, supra note
2, at 90.
92. Green, supra note 17, at 7, 12, 14. Psychiatrist Richard Green contends that any
difficulty experienced by the children in the two samples can be attributed to their
mother's divorced status, rather than their mother's sexual identity. Id. at 14. The chil-
dren interviewed by Green "were able to comprehend and verbalize the atypical nature
of their parents' lifestyles and to view that atypicality in the broader perspective of the
cultural norm." Green, supra note 90, at 696.
93. M.A.B. v. R.B., 134 Misc. 2d 317, 323-24, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 964 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1986) (citing M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 436-39, 404 A.2d 1256, 1262-63
(1979)).
94. 134 Misc. 2d at 323-24, 510 N.Y.S. 2d at 964..
95. Id. at 323, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
96. Id. at 323-26, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 964-66. Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
In Palmore the state could not remove a child from custody of natural mother where she
had married a person of a different race.
The court stated that
"[the issue is] whether.., private biases and the possible injury they might inflict
are permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from the custody of
its natural mother. We have little difficulty concluding that they are not. The
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Pri-
vate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
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3. The Parental Distraction Myth
The third proposition posited by opponents of child custody
awards to homosexual parents is that a parent's homosexual re-
lationship will necessarily detract from one's parenting ability.97
This proposition is without merit, as a general rule, since a simi-
lar heterosexual extramarital relationship does not ipso facto
provide a basis for denying custody in the absence of a proven
adverse effect on the child. 8 It follows that a homosexual rela-
tionship places no greater time constraints or limitations on a
child-parent relationship than a heterosexual relationship."
According to experts in the field of child psychology, the quality
of the parent-child relationship . . . is the single most important
criterion which should be used in determining the best interests
of the child . . . . Heterosexuality is no guarantee of good
parenthood, just as homosexuality is no guarantee of bad
parenthood.'00
4. The Potential Future Harm Myth
Finally, even in cases where the child of a homosexual has
not experienced difficulty, judges and psychiatrists have denied
homosexual parents custody, based on a future propensity for
child psychopathology.'"' Yet researchers conclude that there is
no statistical difference between the psychopathology of children
raised in homosexual home environments and children raised in
indirectly, give them effect."
Id. at 433.
97. Cf. Kleber, supra note 2, at 82 (status as lesbian mother detracts from ability to
care for her children).
98. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
99. Cf. Bozett, supra note 2, at 553 (gay fathers have a long-term emotional invest-
ment in their children).
100. Basile, supra note 2, at 18.
101. J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("[Tlhe potential
for physical and emotional harm exists if the restrictions on visitation are not im-
posed."); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (probable devastating effect
of lesbian life style upon children had been established); Cabalquinto v. Cabalquinto, 100
Wash. 2d 325, 328, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (1983) (trial court found that visitation with homo-
sexual parent might cause "some harm"); and Pascarella v. Pascarella, 355 Pa. Super. 5,
9, 512 A.2d 715, 717 (1986) (homosexual relationship might affect child's emotional well-
being). See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 876-84 (general discussion of myths
concerning gay and lesbian parents).
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heterosexual home environments.0 2
C. The Effects of Myths on Judicial Decisions
The above arguments manifest themselves in the denial of
child custody to homosexual parents103 and in judicially re-
stricted visitation and custody rights. 10 4 Frequently a homosex-
ual parent's visitation award will include restrictive provisions:
that the child not remain overnight or visit at the parent's home
while his or her lover or other homosexuals are present; that the
child not be taken to any places where known homosexuals are
present; that the parent not engage the child in any organizations,
activities or publicity involving homosexuals; and, that the parent
not encourage the homosexual lifestyle.0 5
Consider, for instance, In re Jane B.,0 6 decided by the New
York Supreme Court in 1976. The court granted a change in cus-
tody to the father of a ten-year old child based on the disclosure
of the mother's involvement in a lesbian relationship. 107 In
awarding the change in custody to the father, the court catego-
rized the mother's homosexual relationship as "clandestine devi-
102. Kleber, supra note 2, at 81. "While custody decisions have tended to reflect
stereotyped beliefs or fears concerning the detrimental effects of homosexual parenting
practices on child development, a review of the research consistently fails to document
any evidence substantiating these fears." Id.
103. New York decisional law supporting this conclusion can be found in: In re Jane
B., 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1976) (mother who lived with lesbian lover denied
custody); and In re Mara, 3 Misc. 2d 174, 150 N.Y.S.2d 524 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens
County 1956) (mother's custody conditioned on exclusion of lesbian friend). For discus-
sion on the denial of custody to homosexual parents, see Note, supra note 2, at 1035-37;
Rivera, supra note 2, at 329; and Comment, supra note 2, at 859.
104. New York cases supporting this proposition include: Anonymous v. Anonymous,
120 A.D.2d 983, 503 N.Y.S.2d 466 (4th Dep't 1986) (trial court imposed conditions on
bisexual mother's custody and appellate division remitted to trial court for modifica-
tions); Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 108 A.D.2d 120, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1st Dep't 1985) (trial
court conditioned father's visitation on the total exclusion of his lover or any other
homosexuals and precluded the child from being involved in any homosexual activities or
publicity); DiStefano v. DiStefano, 60 A.D.2d 976, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 (4th Dep't 1978)
(mother's visitation conditioned on the total absence of her lesbian friend); and In Re
Jane B., 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (lesbian mother's visitation conditioned on
the exclusion of her lover or any other homosexuals).
105. Gottsfield, Child Custody and Sexual Lifestyles, 23 CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 43
(June 1985).
106. 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848.
107. Id. at 527-28, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss1/4
GAY PARENTING
ate conduct"' 8 and, as such, contrary to the best interests and
welfare of the child.10 9 The court concluded that this homosex-
ual relationship created an improper home environment and
that the totality of the circumstances warranted a change in cus-
tody.110 Moreover, the court severely circumscribed the mother's
visitation rights, forbidding her either to keep the child over-
night or to see the child if the mother was in the company of
other homosexual persons."'
In other jurisdictions, as in New York, courts view restric-
tions on gay parents' custodial or visitation privileges as neces-
sary. " 2 The reasoning of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in
Constant A. v. Paul C.A." 3 is typical: "The controlled partial
custody and visitation order proposed by the trial court will as-
sure a minimum of harm to the children, while permitting the
mother and children to have reasonable contact with each
other."""
In cases where custodial or visitation privileges have been
vested in a gay parent, those privileges are predicated on judi-
cially imposed restrictions. "Judges who restrict gay and lesbian
parents' access to their children often voice suspicions about the
parent's mental health and the quality of their relationship with
their children. Alternatively the judges focus on presumed harm-
108. Id. at 520, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
109. Id. at 527, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 528, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61.
112. For cases imposing custodial and visitation conditions, see Irish v. Irish, 102
Mich. App. 75, 300 N.W.2d 739 (1980) (overnight visitation conditioned on absence of
gay partner); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (mother's lesbian lover or
other lesbian roomate not permitted in shared residence during mother's visits with chil-
dren); J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (restrictions on homosex-
ual father's visitation); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N.C. App. 350, 260 S.E.2d 775 (1979)
(visitation conditioned on absence of homosexual lover); In re J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super.
486, 324 A.2d 90 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), aff'd, 142 N.J. Super. 499, 362 A.2d 54
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (court imposed several restrictions on the visitation rights of
gay father); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 344 Pa. Super. 49, 496 A.2d 1 (1985) (restrictions
on lesbian mother's custody); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)
(visitation privileges preclude visits to home of mother and lesbian lover); and Cabal-
quinto v. Cabalquinto, 43 Wash. App. 518, 718 P.2d 7 (court of appeals expunged certain
portions of visitation decree).
113. 344 Pa. Super. 49, 496 A.2d 1 (1985).
114. Id. at 68, 496 A.2d at 10.
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ful effects on the children's life with those parents.""' 5
There is only one reported case in which restrictions on pa-
rental visitation privileges were categorically rejected. In a 1979
decision, the Court of Appeals of Oregon, in Ashling v. Ash-
ling,"6 deleted as "too restrictive" conditions on a homosexual
parent's visitation privileges. 11 7 The court reasoned that "[s]o
long as the mother's sexual practices remain discreet - a re-
quirement whatever the sexual preferences of the parties might
be . . . - the restriction is inappropriate."'1 8 The view expressed
by this Oregon court appears to be the minority view. 1 9
V. A Comparative Review: The Impact of a Parent's Sexual
Orientation
All courts making custody determinations are guided by the
best interest of the child standard as codified in state statutes
and embodied in judicial decisions.120 Very often, however,
courts have not identified the weight to be given to the sexual
orientation of a parent when evaluating the best interest of the
child. The circumstances which have been deemed sufficient to
consider the impact of a parent's sexual orientation upon the
welfare of the child vary among jurisdictions.
A. The Presumptive Approach
A parent's sexual orientation alone has rarely been identi-
fied by the courts as a basis for denying a parent custody.12' The
court in at least one jurisdiction, however, has recognized a pre-
115. Comment, supra note 2, at 869.
116. 42 Or. App. 47, 599 P.2d 475 (1979).
117. Id. at 50, 599 P.2d at 476.
118. Id. (citation omitted).
119. Dranoff, Homosexuality as a Factor in Determining Custody (An Overview), 19
FAM. L. REv. 7, 13 (Dec. 1987).
120. Comment, supra note 119, at 853 n.5.
121. See Dranoff, supra note 131, at 7. The following cases have held that homosex-
uality does not render a parent unfit per se: Nadler v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d
523, 525, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354 (1967); D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. App.
1981); Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 578-79, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215-16 (1980); Doe
v. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 502, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296 (1983); DiStefano v. DiStefano,
60 A.D.2d 976, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 (4th Dep't 1978); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 344 Pa.
Super. 49, 66, 496 A.2d 1, 9 (1985); Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736, 748, 284 S.E.2d 799, 806
(1981); Cabalquinto v. Cabalquinto, 100 Wash. 2d 325, 329, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (1983).
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sumption in favor of awarding custody to the nonhomosexual
parent in a custody dispute. The Superior Court of Pennsylva-
nia, in Constant A. v. Paul C.A.,' 22 affirmed the denial of a
mother's petition for expanded custody premised primarily on
her acknowledged lesbian relationship.123
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reasoned that "where
there is a custody dispute between members of a traditional
family environment and one of homosexual composition, the
presumption of regularity applies to the traditional relation-
ship." 2 In effect, the court shifted the burden of proof to the
homosexual parent by requiring the homosexual parent to estab-
lish that her sexual orientation had no adverse affect on the
child in question."2 5
B. The Multi-Factor Approach
A parent's sexual orientation alone has rarely provided a ba-
sis for denying a parent custody. 26 Most often when a criterion
for evaluating the sexual orientation of a parent has been identi-
fied, courts have held that this factor is but one among several
to be considered in making the final custody determination.1 2 7
The Supreme Court of Washington in Cabalquinto v.
Cabalquinto128 adopted this legal standard. Citing the decisions
of other state courts, the court held "homosexuality in and of
itself is not a bar to custody or to reasonable rights of visita-
tion.' 1 29 The rationale behind this rule is that priority must be
given to the best interest of the child after careful consideration
of all the relevant facts. 30
In Doe v. Doe,' the Virginia Supreme Court refused to
sever maternal custody rights premised on a mother's lesbian re-
122. 344 Pa. Super. 49, 496 A.2d 1.
123. Id. at 53, 496 A.2d at 3.
124. Id. at 58, 496 A.2d at 5 (emphasis in original).
125. Id.
126. See supra note 121.
127. Rivera, supra note 2, at 330-69 (chronicle of over 50 cases considering a parent's
sexual preference in a custody dispute); Comment, supra note 2, at 893-96 (typical court
holdings on homosexual parenting).
128. 100 Wash. 2d 325, 669 P.2d 886 (1983).
129. Id. at 329, 669 P.2d at 888.
130. Id.
131. 222 Va. 736, 284 S.E.2d 799 (1981).
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lationship. Here the court "decline[d] to hold that every lesbian
mother or homosexual father is per se an unfit parent.' 132
Today, a majority of state courts have recognized that a
parent's homosexuality is not determinative in fixing custody.'33
These courts have adopted the approach that a parent's sexual
preference is one pertinent factor to be considered in determin-
ing custody, but not the controlling factor.' 3 Yet these same
courts adopt somewhat divergent views when evaluating whether
custody of children should vest in a homosexual parent.
A review of representative state court decisions reveals that
the sexual preference factor is given varying weight in the best
interest of the child equation. One court, purportedly adhering
to this approach, expressed the view that a parent's sexual pref-
erence is a "significant factor" to be examined in awarding cus-
tody."'35 In Jacobson v. Jacobson 36 the Supreme Court of North
Dakota overruled the trial court award of custody to the mother,
citing the homosexuality of the mother as the "overriding fac-
tor."'31 7 The court's rationale for this view was expressed as
follows:
[W]e believe that because of the mores of today's society, because
[the mother] is engaged in a homosexual relationship in the home
in which she resides with the children, and because of the lack of
legal recognition of the status of a homosexual relationship, the
best interests of the children will be better served by placing cus-
tody of the children with [their father] . 38
There is no shortage of case law, however, which emphasizes
the importance of considering a parent's sexual preference as
one factor among many. 39 For example, in the case of Hall v.
Hall," the Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed a judgment
132. Id. at 748, 284 S.E.2d at 806.
133. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 75-77, 121 and accompanying text.
135. 314 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 80.
138. Id. at 82.
139. See supra notes 75-77, 121 and accompanying text considering a parent's sexual
preference in a custody dispute; and Comment, supra note 2, at 893-96 (typical court
holdings on homosexual parenting).
140. 95 Mich. App. 614, 291 N.W.2d 143.
[Vol. 9:129
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss1/4
GAY PARENTING
of divorce denying custody to a lesbian mother. The court was
persuaded "that the trial court correctly regarded plaintiff's ho-
mosexuality as only one factor in its determination of moral
fitness." 1'
C. The Nexus Approach
While most courts consider a parent's homosexuality as one
factor among several when fixing custody, a few courts have
gone so far as to require a nexus between a parent's sexual ori-
entation and an adverse effect on the child. " 2 In such courts, a
proposed custodial parent's sexual orientation is appropriately
considered only if it can be shown to have a direct and adverse
impact on a child. This nexus approach is utilized to provide
trial courts with some method of weighing the sexual preference
factor with all other relevant factors in order to advance the best
interest of the child.
In adhering to the nexus approach, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Bezio v. Patenaude4 3 reversed a
lower court decision severing a mother's custodial rights. Re-
manding the case for further proceedings, the court stated that
"[the State may not deprive parents of custody of their children
'simply because their households fail to meet the ideals ap-
proved by the community ... [or] simply because the parents
embrace ideologies or pursue life-styles at odds with the aver-
age.' "'4 Moreover, the court concluded that the trial court did
not sufficiently support its conclusion that custody should re-
main in a guardian. 4 5 "In the total absence of evidence sug-
gesting a correlation between the mother's homosexuality and
her fitness as a parent, we believe the judge's finding that a les-
bian household would adversely affect the children to be without
141. Id. at 615, 291 N.W.2d at 144.
142. The following state courts have given no consideration to the sexual preference
of the parent unless concrete harm to the child is proven: Nadler v. Superior Court, 255
Cal. App. 2d 523, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967); Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 452
N.E.2d 293 (1983); M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 404 A.2d 1256 (1979); Guinan v.
Guinan, 102 A.D.2d 963, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830 (3d Dep't 1984); and Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736,
284 S.E.2d 799 (1981).
143. 381 Mass. 563, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980).
144. Id. at 579, 410 N.E.2d at 1216 (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 578, 410 N.E.2d at 1215.
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basis in the record. 146
While the Bezio decision involved the termination of custo-
dial rights, the opinion did provide a standard for other Massa-
chusetts courts deciding custody disputes between two natural
parents. In Fort v. Fort'4 and Doe v. Doe, 8 this nexus criterion
was employed by the Appeals Court of Massachusetts to evalu-
ate the impact of parental heterosexual and homosexual involve-
ments on the welfare of children.
The Fort court warned trial court judges to be cautious not
to impart their own moral judgments in determining relative fit-
ness between two natural parents. " 9 The court recognized "that
such judgments are appropriate only when it can be shown that
a parent's lifestyle has a direct and articulable adverse impact
on the child, or where there can be no real dispute ... that the
behavior of the custodial parent is related to his or her parent-
ing ability."' 50
The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts in Bezio comports with a trend in other jurisdictions to
award custody to gay parents where such an award is in the chil-
dren's best interest.' 15 It would not be fair to conclude, however,
that the trend in the United States is away from requiring a
greater showing of parental fitness when a homosexual parent
seeks child custody. Some jurisdictions, while tending to de-em-
phasize a parent's sexual orientation, have been more reluctant
than others to award custodial or visitation privileges to homo-
sexual parents.15 2
D. The New York Approach
Under New York statutory law, custodial or visitation privi-
leges may be awarded to either parent based on the best interest
of the child standard, according to the court's discretion.' New
146. Id. at 579, 410 N.E.2d at 1216.
147. 12 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 425 N.E.2d 754 (1981) (father cohabitating with unmar-
ried woman).
148. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 452 N.E.2d 293 (1983) (lesbian mother had live-in lover).
149. 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 415, 425 N.E.2d at 757.
150. Id.
151. See infra notes 190-196 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 103-115 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
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York courts have recognized that a parent's homosexual lifestyle
does not render a parent unfit per se.1" But while the New York
courts have adopted this rule unequivocally, they have not ar-
ticulated a formula for weighing a parent's homosexuality rela-
tive to other factors.
For example, in a 1977 decision, DiStefano v. DiStefano,155
the Appellate Division reiterated the trial court's finding that
homosexuality does not render a parent unfit per se.15' The
court espoused the view that a parent's sexual orientation may
be one relevant factor considered among several when fixing cus-
tody. 1 57 Apparently the court paid only lip service to this rule
since the mother's sexual preference became the pivotal factor in
awarding custody to the father. The court concluded that the
mother's lesbian relationship interfered with her parenting abili-
ties and affirmed the award of primary physical custody to the
father." 8
In recent years New York courts have taken a more progres-
sive approach when evaluating the best interest of the child in a
custody dispute in which one parent is gay.'59 The relevance of a
parent's homosexuality upon the determination of fitness was
154. The rule in New York is that a parent's sexual preference does not render a
parent unfit per se. E.g., DiStefano v. DiStefano, 60 A.D.2d 976, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 (4th
Dep't 1978).
This author's case law analysis includes New York decisions involving lesbian
mothers, as well as gay fathers. Cases involving lesbian mothers are relied upon for their
precedential value since there are few reported cases concerning gay fathers. At least one
commentator has suggested that a gay father's sexual orientation would be considered to
the same extent as a lesbian mother's sexual orientation has been considered in custody
conflicts. Hitchens, supra note 2, at 89.
155. 60 A.D.2d 976, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 (4th Dep't 1978).
156. Id. at 976-77, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 637-38. The DiStefano court relied on the prece-
dential value of cases in which a divorced parent was involved in an adulterous hetero-
sexual relationship. Id. (citing e.g., Feldman v. Feldman, 45 A.D.2d 320, 324, 358
N.Y.S.2d 507, 512 (2d Dep't 1974) (mother's involvement with a married man did not
render her unfit)).
157. 60 A.D.2d at 976-77, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 637-38. The Appellate Division deter-
mined that "[wihile the sexual lifestyle of a parent may properly be considered in deter-
mining what is best for the children, its consideration must be limited to its present or
reasonably predictable effect upon the children's welfare." Id. at 977, 401 N.Y.S.2d at
637 (citations omitted).
158. Id. at 977, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 638. The DiStefano court also affirmed the mother's
restrictive visitation award premised on the exclusion of her lesbian lover. Id.
159. Rivera, supra note 2, at 359-61; Redinger, Gay Father Prevails, 73 A.B.A. J. 75
(Apr. 1, 1987).
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again considered in 1984, in Guinan v. Guinan.160 In Guinan the
alleged lesbian mother was awarded primary custody of her
three children and the father appealed, asserting that the
mother was lesbian. 161
In affirming the trial court's award of custody, this New
York court adopted the nexus test16 2 for determining when a
parent's sexual lifestyle should be an issue in a custody dispute.
The court emphatically held that "[a] parent's sexual indiscre-
tions should be a consideration in a custody dispute only if they
are shown to adversely affect the child's welfare." 63 Since all ev-
idence adduced at trial indicated that the mother was "a fit,
competent and loving parent,"16 the court concluded that the
mother's alleged lesbianism had no adverse affect on her
children.
The best interest standard adopted in New York was inter-
preted in Gottlieb v. Gottlieb'6" to preclude certain restrictive
provisions in a gay father's visitation award. In Gottlieb, the
court expunged two restrictive provisions from the custody
agreement which predicated the father's visitation privileges on
the exclusion of his life partner or any other homosexuals."66
The court modified a third provision to read "the child will not
160. 102 A.D.2d 963, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830 (3d Dep't 1984).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 964, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 831. The result reached in Guinan cannot be clearly
viewed as a victory for lesbian and gay parents, since in Guinan there existed a factual
dispute as to whether the mother had engaged in homosexual relations as alleged. Ac-
cordingly, the result achieved in Guinan can be distinguished from the result achieved in
DiStefano.
Nevertheless, the nexus test articulated in Guinan is the test preferred by gay rights
litigators. Rivera, supra note 2, at 330. "[T]he homosexuality of a parent should only be
an issue insofar as the parent's sexual orientation can be proven to have harmed the
child." Id.
163. 102 A.D.2d at 964, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
164. Id.
165. 108 A.D.2d 120, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1st Dep't 1985).
166. Id. at 121, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 181. The two excised provisions provided:
[10] ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant's visitation privileges at
his home are conditioned on the total exclusion of his lover or any other homosex-
uals during such visitation periods; and it is further
[11] ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant's visitation privileges not
limited to his home are conditioned upon the total exclusion of his lover and any
other homosexuals from any contact with defendant and child ....
Id. at 122, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 182 (as set forth in the concurring opinion of Kupferman, J.)
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be involved in any homosexual activities or publicity.1' 67 In spite
of this, the court did not fix a criterion for determining which
types of restrictive conditions should be eliminated from custody
decrees.
The court's holding in Gottlieb represents an advancement
in legal thought. In addition to requiring a positive showing that
a parent's homosexuality has a direct and adverse impact on the
child,168 the majority established that certain visitation privi-
leges may far exceed anything necessary to protect the best in-
terest of a child.
While the Gottlieb opinion may represent a change in judi-
cial perspective, the court stopped short of accepting the Oregon
view that all restrictive provisions are impermissible. Judge
Sandler, in his dissente9 maintained that the third provision of
the visitation award should also have been deleted.1 70 He urged
the court to consider "the unpleasant connotations inherent in
the special restriction" ' imposed on the homosexual parent
when contrasted with the absence of a similar limitation on the
heterosexual parent.' 72
The intrinsic value of conditional visitation privileges was
further challenged in Anonymous v. Anonymous.' 73 The court
did not decide whether conditional visitation provisions were
permissible, but held simply that "some condition should be im-
posed for the child's protection, such as prohibiting the child's
167. Id. at 121, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 181. Prior to the modification this provision read:
"[12] ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that during defendant's periods of visitation the
child will not be taken to any place where known homosexuals are present nor will de-
fendant involve the child in any homosexual activities or publicity." Id. at 122, 488
N.Y.S.2d at 182 (as set forth in the concurring opinion of Kupferman, J.).
168. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
169. 108 A.D.2d at 123, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
170. Id. at 123, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 183. The dissenting judge reasoned that:
It of course goes without saying that a small child should not be involved in sexual
activities or publicity of any character, homosexual or heterosexual. We are unable
to discern from the record a basis for the assumption that the defendant would
expose his child to such inappropriate activities sufficient to justify such a
direction.
Id.
171. Id. at 124, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 183 (Sandier, J., dissenting).
172. Id. The dissenting judge would not have tolerated any but the most necessary
restrictions to promote the best interest of the child. Id.
173. 120 A.D.2d 983, 503 N.Y.S.2d 466 (4th Dep't 1986).
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presence during, or involvement with, homosexual contact or
conduct .... ,,174 Nevertheless, this court found that the trial
court had abused its discretionary powers by restricting a bisex-
ual mother's "right to maintain her life-style and privacy well
beyond that necessary to protect the child from reasonably pre-
dictable effects. '175
Although conditional visitation provisions may not be used
to unnecessarily interfere with a parent's right to maintain his or
her lifestyle and privacy, trial courts would appear to have some
authority to impose restrictive custody provisions following the
decision in Anonymous. Thus, it would appear that an individ-
ual jurist could inadvertently give effect to societal bias176 and
myths about gay parenting. 77 At least it is clear that a trial
court could force a gay father to choose between his life partner
and his child, if a court prohibited the child from being present
in the father's residence which he shared with his life partner.
A homosexual father seeking child custody in a New York
court will no longer be automatically rendered unfit by virtue of
his gay lifestyle. 17 8 A gay father's lifestyle becomes an issue in a
custody contest only when a competing party can establish a
nexus between the parental conduct in question and some spe-
cific harm to the child.'719 Notwithstanding the nexus criterion, a
gay father's custody award or visitation privileges may be condi-
tioned to protect the child from reasonably predictable effects.18
The New York Supreme Court was most recently called
upon to consider a custody dispute involving a gay father in
M.A.B. v. R.B. " ' The court found that for the purposes of New
York's Domestic Relations Law Section 240182 and consistent
with Guinan and its progeny, 83 a father's homosexuality did not
disqualify him from obtaining custody of his child.
174. Id. at 984, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 8-47 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 85-119 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 153-158 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 159-164 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 165-175 and accompanying text.
181. 134 Misc. 2d 317, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1986).
182. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1986).
183. See supra notes 171-182, 184-190 and accompanying text.
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The court, applying the nexus test articulated in Guinan,'
held that a father was not an unfit or improper custodian merely
because he was homosexual. 88 The court concluded that the de-
terminative consideration in the award of custody must be the
selection of the home environment that will promote the best
interest of the child.'86 The court stated that a parent's sexual
orientation should be considered only to the extent that a nexus
exists between the homosexuality of a parent and a directly del-
eterious effect on the child.'
In making the determination of custody, the court found
that the father's homosexuality had no adverse effect on the
child. 88 The court awarded primary physical custody of the
child to the gay father, reserving liberal visitation rights to the
mother. 89
The supreme court's decision in M.A.B. v. R.B. is consistent
with the decisional law of other jurisdictions that have embraced
the nexus criterion.' 90 Similar decisions have been reached
by courts in Alaska,19' California,' 2  Massachusetts,' 9  New
Jersey, 14 Oregon, 195 and Virginia."'
184. See supra notes 160-164 and accompanying text.
185. 134 Misc. 2d at 331, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 326, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
188. 134 Misc. 2d at 331, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 969. The court found R.B. to be a "caring
and worthy father." Id.
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 142-152 and accompanying text.
191. S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 878-79 (Alaska 1985) (court invoked nexus test
and found no evidence that mother's lesbianism would adversely affect the child).
192. Nadler v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App.2d 523, 525, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354
(1967) (finding trial court failed to exercise discretion when it found lesbian mother
unfit).
193. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
194. M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 439, 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (1979) (homosexual
parent awarded custody based on no showing of harm to child).
195. E.g., A. v. A., 15 Or. App. 353, 514 P.2d 358 (1973) (gay father). Cf. Ashling v.
Ashling, 42 Or. App. 47, 599 P.2d 475 (1979) (restrictive provisions in visitation award
inappropriate where mother's lesbian relationship caused no harm to children).
196. Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736, 284 S.E.2d 799 (1981) (child not adversely affected by
the conduct of lesbian mother).
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VI. Analysis
The extent to which the homosexuality of a father will re-
flect on the final award of custody remains uncertain. This un-
certainty is in part the result of the highly individualized nature
of custody disputes,197 inadequate' 8 and anonymous case re-
porting, 99 sealing of records,200 judges' idiosyncratic decisions, 01
fear among some gays to fight for custody,02 and limited appel-
late review.203 Compounding this uncertainty is the fact that
some gay and lesbian parents are reluctant to reveal their sexual
orientation during a custody hearing due to their fear that this
revelation will become the focal point of the proceeding, 2  pre-
clude them from obtaining custody,05 or provide a basis for the
court to impose conditions on visitation and custody.1
0 6
A. The Underlying Ambiguity in the Statutory Standard
The primary legal consideration in awarding child custody
is the best interest of the child.07 Problems arise when the judi-
ciary tries to resolve the ambiguity inherent in such an evanes-
cent standard. These problems are further exacerbated when the
best interest of the child standard is applied to a factual situa-
tion where one parent is a homosexual father.
The idealized standard of the best interest of the child is
based on the proposition that the judiciary can make appropri-
197. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 229.
198. Id. (case reporting is inadequate due to selective and truncated recitations of
the facts). See also Basile, supra note 2, at 5 (cases are "often entirely omitted or se-
verely truncated.").
199. Rivera, supra note 2, at 329.
200. Id. at 329-30.
201. Id. at 330.
202. D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) ("hesitancy on the part
of the homosexual parent to reveal sexual preference for fear of retaliation by employers
and public disapproval."). Gay parents, however, are becoming more vocal in fighting for
custody. See Family Feuds: Gays Fight For Custody, A.B.A. J. 38 (Dec. 1984); and
Hitchens, supra note 2, at 89.
203. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
204. For discussion on how a parent's homosexuality becomes a central concern of
courts, see Sheppard, supra note 2, at 223; Basile, supra note 2, at 13; and Hitchens,
supra note 2, at 92.
205. See Polikoff, supra note 2, at 907-08; Hitchens, supra note 2, at 92, 93, 94.
206. See supra notes 103-115 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 48-80 and accompanying text.
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ate factual judgments about what children need. This standard
offers no assurances that the judges and attorneys applying this
standard are not imposing anything other than their own senti-
mental values about child rearing.
With regard to homosexuality, many decisions based on the
best interest of the child presuppose that a child whose parent is
socially devalued is injured by placement with that parent.0 8 At
the very least, in many cases judges and attorneys have inti-
mated that a child raised in a homosexual home environment is
necessarily worse off than a child raised in a heterosexual home
environment.2 0 9 The more subtle issue in these cases is to what
extent the court has given tacit approval to social and moral
proscriptions against homosexual expression.
Although courts do grant custodial and visitation privileges
to homosexual parents, these privileges are often conditioned on
the exclusion of other homosexuals or preclude overnight vis-
its.210 Such conditions are at least suspect when contrasted with
the absence of similar limitations on heterosexual parents.21'
B. A Suggested Statutory Revision
A national review of judicial decisions reveals that the de-
termination of the best interest of the child may be achieved in
one of three diverse ways where a homosexual parent seeks cus-
tody. The first approach, adopted by one court,212 recognizes a
presumption of regularity in favor of an award of custody to a
nonhomosexual parent in a custody dispute.213 The prevailing
approach, though, is that a parent's sexual orientation alone
does not provide a sufficient basis for denying child custody. Ju-
risdictions adopting this approach hold that a parent's sexual
orientation is one factor to be considered among several.2"" Fi-
nally, in a handful of jurisdictions including New York, the
courts have required that a nexus be shown between the sexual
orientation of a parent and an adverse effect on a child before
208. See supra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
209. Id.
210. See supra notes 103-115 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 126-141 and accompanying text.
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such an orientation will be considered relevant at all.2 15
Both the presumptive approach and the multifactor ap-
proach permit the introduction of evidence of private sexual be-
havior without the slightest showing that this behavior has any
negative impact on the welfare of the child.116 These approaches,
in essence, shift the burden of proof to lesbian and gay parents.
Instead of receiving evenhanded treatment, lesbian and gay par-
ents struggle to overcome time-honored biases and assumptions
about the adversity of homosexual orientations on the welfare of
children.21 7
The nexus approach reflects an attempt by some jurisdic-
tions to afford homosexual parents the opportunity to litigate
custody on the same footing as heterosexual parents. Here,
courts have required a positive showing that a parent's homosex-
uality has a present, direct, and adverse impact on a child's wel-
fare before such an orientation will be considered relevant. 2 8
This heightened evidentiary criterion is analogous to that em-
ployed where a parent is involved in an extramarital heterosex-
ual relationship.1 9 The intended purpose of this approach is to
prevent the introduction of a parent's sexual orientation to dis-
tract from the real issue, namely, serving the best interests of
the child.
In an attempt to assure that this nexus test is fairly and
consistently applied in New York, the Domestic Relations Law
should be revised to reflect this case law criterion.220 Although
evidence concerning a parent's same-sex orientation should not
be excluded in all custody cases, such evidence should not be
permitted to be introduced as a red herring when difficult deci-
215. See supra notes 142-164 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 121-141 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 85-119 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 142-150 and accompanying text. Consistent with the nexus test
"the homosexuality of a parent should only be an issue insofar as the parent's sexual
orientation can be proven to have harmed the child." Rivera, supra note 2, at 330 (em-
phasis added).
219. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
220. A comparable criterion has been enacted by the Oregon legislature. The nexus
standard codified in Oregon provides in part: "[T]he court shall consider the conduct,
marital status, income, social environment or lifestyle of either party only if it is shown
that any of these factors are causing or may cause emotional or physical damage to the
child." OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(4) (1987).
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sions are being made about the future welfare of minor children.
It would be helpful if the state legislature would formally
adopt the nexus criterion for assessing the impact of sexual ori-
entation upon child custody proceedings.221 This statutory provi-
sion would promote a certain level of objectivity in an otherwise
subjective and emotionally charged child custody proceeding.
Furthermore, this heightened evidentiary standard would give
lesbian and gay parents a legal basis to appeal lower court deci-
sions when their sexual orientation has been accorded undue
weight in the child custody equation.
Having defined this nexus criterion for awarding child cus-
tody according to the best interest of the child standard, there
remains some doubt as to how this criterion will be refined and
effectively applied. The nexus criterion will not dispel societal
myths about homosexuality, but may provide some legal protec-
tion to homosexual parents seeking to preserve continuity in
their relationships with their children and in their chosen
lifestyle.
C. Time for Judicial Consciousness
There is probably no better way of protecting the rights of
homosexual fathers, and serving the best interests of their
children, than to raise individual consciousness concerning
homophobic attitudes in our society. Individual jurists, attorneys
and child custody litigators should examine societal assumptions
and historical proscriptions concerning homosexuality when they
approach the facts of a particular case. Recognition must be
given to the fact that a parent's same-sex orientation is often
evaluated within a larger legal framework that is historically
homophobic. An effort should be made to set aside personal val-
ues that may conflict with the judiciary's responsibility of best
providing for the child's custody, care, education, and main-
tenance.
221. One commentator has suggested that "[t]he application of the 'nexus' test is
problematic in those states that do not statutorily require a showing of present harm...
to the child." Rivera, supra note 2, at 330.
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VII. Conclusion
'A gay father seeking child custody must overcome societal
and judicial assumptions about the adverse impact of his homo-
sexual orientation on the welfare of minor children. Although
homosexuality is rarely in and of itself a sufficient basis for de-
nying custody, a parent's sexual orientation has been accorded
considerable weight in the child custody equation.
Gay consciousness is a relatively new phenomenon and New
York courts have expanded their understanding of homosexual
parenting. New York decisional law comports with a current
movement to encourage the award of custody to the party who
can best meet the child's needs, irrespective of that parent's sex-
ual preference. In New York, a proposed custodial parent's sex-
ual orientation is appropriately considered only when it can be
shown in fact to have an adverse impact on a child's welfare.
But the question still remains whether the judicial standard de-
veloped by New York courts can be fairly and consistently ap-
plied, even if codified, in light of the history of homophobia in
American society.
Marianne T. O'Toole
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